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On July 8th, 2014, Israel launched a massive military attack in the Gaza Strip, which has 
been ruled by Hamas, a Palestinian Islamic organization, since 2005, when Israel 
withdrew its army from this territory. Israel accused Hamas to have started the conflict 
by firing rockets from Gaza to Israel. After weeks of bombardment, 1881 Palestinian 
and 67 Israeli citizens died (Yourish & Keller, 2014). International organizations accused 
both sides of many human rights violations and urged for a cease fire (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014). Worldwide, most countries manifested support for Israel based on the 
fact that Hamas started the conflict (National Post, 2014). The United States, for example, 
supported its long-term allies, by sending $225 million in military aid to Israel (Everett, 
2014). But what caused disquiet in the international media was the fact that Brazil’s 
Foreign Ministry condemned the “escalation of violation,” urged an end to the conflict, 
and added, “We strongly condemn the disproportionate use of force by Israel in the 
Gaza Strip” (Tavener, 2014, p.1). Israel did not like the statement and its Foreign 
Ministry spokesman suggested, “This is an unfortunate demonstration of why Brazil, 
an economic and cultural giant, remains a diplomatic dwarf” (Keinon, 2014, p. 7). 
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Curiously, the international press did not consider this as the worst insult directed at 
Brazil (Taylor, 2014). The Israeli spokesman added, “This is not football. In football, 
when a game ends in a draw, you think it is proportional, but when it finishes 7-1, it’s 
disproportionate. Sorry to say, but not so in real life and under international law” 
(Taylor, 2014). 
 The diplomat was referring to the humiliating defeat Brazil had suffered to 
Germany in one of the semi-finals of the home-hosted 2014 FIFA World Cup, in the 
very same month of that Gaza conflict. For many sport media persons, this was one of 
the worst and most embarrassing sporting defeats ever (McNulty, 2014). Clearly, in 
using a very bitter loss in sport, the Israeli spokesman meant to offend Brazil. But 
should Brazil take more offense on being called a diplomatic dwarf or a sporting contest 
loser? Even more intriguing is why the international media spread the second comment 
so intensely and considered it even more offensive than the first one. 
 Following a recent trend among developing countries, Brazil bid and won the 
rights to host the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, in Rio de Janeiro. 
The country has many and diverse political motivations to host such events. Certainly 
among these motivations, improving its diplomatic role in international affairs is a very 
important one. Historically, hosting sport mega-events has represented a unique 
opportunity to improve public diplomacy (Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004). The 
current hosting trend is the third wave of the connection between sports mega-events 
and diplomacy development. The first wave happened after World War II, when the 
Axis countries hosted three Olympic Games in a period of sixteen years (Rome 1960, 
Tokyo 1964, and Munich, 1972) in an attempt to send a message of recovery to the rest 
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of the world (Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004). The second wave came in the 1960s 
through the 1990s, when postcolonial countries used both sport mega-events (Mexico 
City 1968 and Seoul 1988 Olympic Games) and international events (South Africa 1995 
Rugby World Cup and Malaysia 1998 Commonwealth Games) to indicate industrial, 
economic, and social progress. The third wave started with the Beijing 2008 Olympic 
Games and passed through South Africa 2010 and Brazil 2014 FIFA World Cups, Sochi 
2014 Winter Olympics, and the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic Games. Considering that 
Russia and Qatar will host the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, respectively, this third 
wave continues. 
 This chapter offers an assessment of Brazil’s political use of not one but two sports 
mega-events, and considers whether hosting the most prestigious and globally 
recognized and watched sporting events will see the country move beyond the 
“diplomatic dwarf” stereotype touched on above. The chapter unfolds as follows: first, 
we situate the debate on Brazil among the wider literature on sports mega-events and 
the renaissance of sport and diplomacy studies. We then discuss the diplomatic 
problems facing Brazil, before looking specifically at Brazil’s double host status and 
what this may mean for the nation. 
Sports Mega-Events and Diplomatic Studies 
Much ink has been spilled discussing sports mega-events, including the legacies they 
are supposed to produce (Preuss, 2007), the leveraging strategies states adopt to get at 
such legacies (Chalip, 2006), the politics and the political use of these events (Grix, 
2013), the economic benefits states can gain through hosting (Gratton, Shibli, & 
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Coleman, 2006), and the impact of major sporting events on citizens and their attitudes 
towards sport and physical activity (Weed et al., 2012). A differentiation in the literature 
is along the lines of type of states hosting (advanced capitalist versus emerging states) 
and among the events themselves, with the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup—both 
of which Brazil were charged with hosting—generally seen as sports megas of the first 
order and thus, globally the most prestigious and sought-after (on emerging states see 
Grix and Lee, 2013; for a categorization of sports mega-events see Black, 2008). Thus, the 
case of Brazil dealt with in this chapter is one of an emerging state taking on the double 
host status of the world’s largest sporting spectacles. 
 It is fair to say that the academic literature on sport and politics in general is 
relatively thin on the ground; the literature on international relations (IR) and sport and 
diplomacy and sport, in particular, is even thinner. Recently, there has been an increase 
in IR and sport and diplomacy in sport, the latter drawing on Joseph Nye’s concept of 
soft power (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2014; Cornelissen, 2010; Manzenreiter, 2010; 
Nygård & Gates, 2013). Scholars have turned to Nye’s concept as a lens through which 
to explain why states host sports mega-events in terms of their place in the international 
arena. What binds both emerging and advanced capitalist states when hosting sports 
megas is the attempt to leverage the occasion to (a) better a tarnished image (e.g., 
Germany, South Africa etc.); (b) put their states on the international map (e.g., Qatar, 
South Korea); (c) signal to the world their growing economic, diplomatic, and/or 
political strength (e.g., China, Russia, etc.); and (d) to show the watching world that 
they, the hosts, can put on what is one of the most logically complex events that exists. 
Of course, these reasons are not mutually exclusive and many states seek to use the 
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event to achieve all of the above. The Brazilian state does not have a tarnished image, as 
Germany had prior to 2006 and their hosting of the FIFA World Cup. While Brazil is 
already on the world stage, it seeks to step out of the shadow of its depiction as a 
“diplomatic dwarf.” The double-host status of Brazil is designed to send a signal that 
Brazil has finally arrived and now punches its weight; finally, pulling off both events 
without any major hitches will send out a message that Brazil is ready to do business 
with the most advanced states in the world. 
Current Diplomatic Challenges of Brazil 
In 2015, Brazil ranks as the world’s fifth-largest landmass, fifth-largest population, and 
seventh-largest economy. Brazil has been considered an emergent power since 2001, 
when a Goldman Sachs report coined the term BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) 
to refer to the group of growth markets that nowadays accounts for about 20% of global 
gross domestic product and is expected to overtake the U.S. economy by the next 
decade (Bodman, Wolfensohn, & Sweig, 2011; Malamud, 2011). Despite the recent 
reduction in the economic growth of these nations, the BRICs kept working together to 
turn the positive predictions into reality. In 2014, they agreed to start a $50 billion 
“BRICs Bank” to invest in developing nations projects, alongside a $100 billion pool of 
reserve (Kenny, 2014). Brazil has also been part of the so-called IBSA alliance along with 
India and South Africa since 2003. Basically, these three countries have been lobbying 
for reforms at the United Nations and looking for a stronger participation of developing 
countries (Flemes, 2009). The emergence of Brazil as a global actor has attracted the 
attention of the United States, the European Union, and the G-8, which have been 
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calling Brazil a “strategic partner” in their diplomatic meetings. 
 The increased importance of Brazil in the international political scenario in the last 
decade has changed the country’s diplomatic aspirations. The country has not hidden 
its major diplomatic aspiration: to have a permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). France, United Kingdom, and Russia have supported Brazil’s 
intentions, while the United States and China remained uncommitted in their support 
(Brown, 2012). However, in 2011, an independent task force of the Council of Foreign 
Relations analyzed Brazil-U.S. relationships and recommended that U.S. policymakers 
should recognize Brazil as a global actor and support its bid for a permanent seat on the 
UNSC (Bodman et al., 2011). The basis for this recommendation is that the US has 
exercised unilateral influence in South America since the 1800s (Brown, 2012); therefore, 
that task force indicated that practical steps, like supporting Brazil on the UNSC, would 
signal a more mature relationship with the “new” Brazil (Bodman et al., 2011). This 
recommendation has not been implemented so far. 
 There are at least two recent decisions made by Brazilian diplomats that have 
created a sense of suspicion in U.S. authorities regarding supporting Brazil on the 
UNSC. First, in 2010, as a nonpermanent member of the Council, Brazil voted against 
implementing sanctions on Iran (and indirectly against the US). The Security Council 
was imposing additional sanctions on Iran because of its alleged “lack of compliance 
with previous resolutions on ensuring the peaceful nature of its nuclear program” 
(United Nations, 2010, p. 1). Brazil explained its vote in affirming that additional 
sanctions “would lead to the suffering of the Iranian people and play into the hands of 
those on all sides who did not want a peaceful resolution of the issue” (United Nations, 
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2010, p. 4). Second, in 2011, Brazil along with Germany, Russia, China, and India 
abstained from voting on tightened sanctions on Libya and stressed “the need for 
peaceful resolution of the conflict and warned against unintended consequences of 
armed intervention” (United Nations, 2011, p. 3). The conflict referred to was the 
Libyan civil war, which broke out in 2011. 
 According to Brown (2012), in both instances Brazil showed coherence with its 
diplomatic values of nonmilitary intervention as far as possible. Although Brazil’s 
military budget exceeded all other South American nations combined (Malamud, 2011), 
the country has decided to rely heavily on soft power to conquer its international space. 
Malamud (2011) noted that Brazil’s market size, enormous exports, and investment 
potential have been effective in international affairs. Recent events have reinforced 
Brazil’s option to rely on soft power when planning diplomatic growth. 
 Cason and Power (2009) claimed that, since 1995, the changes in Brazilian foreign 
policies have been rooted in international, national, or individual levels (as proposed by 
Waltz, 1959). The end of the cold war (international level), the resurgence of democracy 
(national level), and the election of two presidents (individual level) who focused on the 
changing Brazilian role in the international arena have changed Brazil’s foreign policy. 
Cason and Power added that the “presidentialization” of Brazilian international 
affairs—mainly conducted by the two last presidents, Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1995-2002) and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003-2010)—had positive impacts on Brazil’s 
profile on the world stage. Both presidents worked to strengthen the “Mercosul”—the 
free trade agreement between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela. 
During his term, President Lula constantly expressed a deep desire to see a stronger 
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South America and believed that Brazil’s leadership would be fundamental to creating 
a better continent (Cason & Power, 2009). 
 Not by chance, during Lula’s term, Brazil was chosen to host the 2014 FIFA World 
Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games (in Rio de Janeiro). Some authors argue that the 
involvement of the president in the Olympic bid was fundamental in convincing the 
IOC to grant, for the first time ever, the Olympic Games to a South American country 
(Carey, Mason, & Misener, 2011). The fact that Brazil was chosen as the host of the 2014 
World Cup was not as important as the fact it was chosen as the host of the 2016 
Olympics. In fact, other South American countries (including Brazil itself) have hosted 
previous editions of the FIFA World Cup (e.g., Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina). 
 Since 2007, Brazil has used international sports events as part of its strategy to 
expand its soft power, diplomacy, and international relevance. Only in the last ten 
years, the country hosted the 2007 Pan-American Games, the 2011 Military World 
Games, the 2013 Confederations Cup, the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and the 2016 Rio 
Olympic Games. While the three former events have been called second-order sport 
events (Black & Van Der Westhuizen, 2004), they can be understood as a necessary 
precursor to hosting first-order events, the latter two are definitely the most important 
global sporting events in the world. Consequently, these events have brought 
unprecedented media attention to the host country. In the next section, we discuss how 
Brazil can use these sports mega-events to expand its soft power and grow in 
diplomatic stature. 
Brazil, Sport Mega-Events, and Diplomacy 
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Brazil has tried to use the promotional effects of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 
Olympic Games to expand its soft power and diplomatic status. The literature supports 
the idea of positive relationships between hosting sport mega-events and increasing soft 
power (Finlay & Xin, 2010; Grix, Brannagan, & Houlihan, 2015). As suggested by Grix et 
al. (2015), successfully hosting sport mega-events “is increasingly acknowledged to be a 
highly visible and potential positive signal to other countries, acting as a valuable asset 
in accelerating their entry to, and acceptance within, the world’s mature economies” (p. 
470). Soft power is directly related to public diplomacy, since both involve the ability of 
having influence over others via attraction instead of coercion (Nye, 2008). Therefore, in 
expanding its soft power by hosting sport mega-events, Brazil is actually looking to 
improve its public diplomacy. Cornelissen (2010) asserted that Olympic Games and 
World Cups have been used by developing countries “to showcase economic 
achievements, to signal diplomatic stature or to project, in the absence of other forms of 
international influence, soft power” (p. 3008). 
 However, Grix et al. (2015) proposed that Brazil is not a typical case of an 
emerging nation using the association with sport mega-events to increase soft power 
and improve public diplomacy. They argued that Brazil is different because it is already 
“at the forefront of the emerging powers discourse” (p. 474) and it is using the mega-
events to shift from a regional leader to a global leader. In agreement with this 
statement, Malamud (2011) reported that Brazil’s role as an emergent global player has 
been confirmed by some invitations from important international institutions. For 
example, in 2005, the G-8 formally invited five developing countries (Brazil, China, 
India, Mexico, and South Africa), in the so-called G-8+5, to join the group talks in the 
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summit hosted in Gleneagles, Scotland. Two years later, the European Union invited 
Brazil for a strategic partnership, leaving other South American countries out. 
Naturally, Brazil’s prominence has not resounded well among other South American 
nations, which have developed strategies to slow that rising path (Malamud, 2011). For 
instance, although a regional commercial partner, Argentina has not supported Brazil’s 
aspirations to become a permanent member on the United Nations Security Council. 
According to Malamud, Brazil has found that global diplomatic ambition can prompt 
regional resentment, creating what he called “the mounting mismatch between the 
regional and global recognition of Brazilian status” (Malamud, 2011, p. 19).  
 From a diplomatic point of view, probably the most effective way to act would be 
to forget the regional leadership and focus on the global context (Cason & Power, 2009; 
Malamud, 2011). However, as mentioned previously, mainly during Lula’s term, 
leading South America was almost an obsession. In this regard, hosting the Olympic 
Games has a special meaning. Since the bid campaign, Lula has proposed that the 2016 
Olympics should be not only the Rio and Brazil Olympic Games, but the South America 
Games. The former president asserted, “It is time to make the Olympics democratic, 
developing countries have the right to host the Games. . . . South America has the right 
to hold the Games” (Bugge, 2009). Lula knew that no other country in South America 
would have the infrastructure and financial resources to compete for the Games. 
Therefore, he used the special economic moment of the country to bid for the Games 
and consolidate himself as a regional leader. Interestingly, Brazil did not use the 2014 
FIFA World Cup in the same way, simply because it would not work with the World 
Cup. First, the World Cup has been previously hosted by other South American 
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countries. Second, soccer is the preferred sport in the majority of the South American 
countries, which already have at least the initial infrastructure to host it. Finally, 
Brazilian leaders know that the World Cup will eventually be hosted by other South 
American countries, which is unlikely to happen with the Olympic Games, at least in 
the short term. 
 However, hosting the Olympic Games is not a guarantee of growing diplomatic 
power. Other emerging states have tried to use sport mega-events to attain this aim, but 
they have run into some trouble. For example, investigating the recent experiences of 
Russia (Sochi 2014) and China (Beijing 2008) with the Olympic Games, scholars 
highlighted controversial policies regarding human rights and the treatment of 
minorities that have hindered these countries’ intentions to use the Olympics to 
accomplish diplomatic objectives (Arnold & Foxall, 2014; Manzenreiter, 2010). The 
negative aspect of hosting major games has been termed both a double-edged sword 
and soft disempowerment (Grix & Houlian, 2014; Brannagan, 2014). Both terms point to 
an effect opposite that states set out to achieve through hosting: rather than enhancing 
their global status, the media attention brought to bear on hosts magnifies negative 
aspects of a state’s politics, culture, or human rights record. Qatar is a case in point: the 
initial jubilation on winning the hosting rights for the 2022 FIFA World Cup gave way, 
quickly, to full-scale investigative journalism into Qatar’s treatment of their foreign 
workforce, frantically building sporting infrastructure from scratch. 
 Additionally, according to Manzenreiter (2010), hosting the 2008 Olympic Games 
did not change the antiquated and oppressive designs adopted by China to deal with 
Taiwan and Tibet. Therefore, considering that during the 2008 Olympics the eyes of the 
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world were on China, even those people who had not previously known about its 
insistence on state sovereignty and violations of human rights. Apparently, such 
exposition made diplomatic relationships between China and Western countries more 
complicated (Manzenreiter, 2010). Similarly, the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics brought 
more decline than improvement for Russia in terms of diplomatic relationships. The 
controversial law that prohibited “propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations” 
exposed Russia’s intolerance toward the LGBT community became the most-
commented-on human right violation in the international press in 2014 (Arnold & 
Foxall, 2014). In addition to the state-sponsored homophobia, during the preparation 
for Sochi 2014, Russia faced other problems (such as journalism censure and the arrest 
of Greenpeace activists), which damaged its project to send a positive image of the 
country abroad in association with the Olympics (Simons, 2014). Taken together, 
Russia’s use of sports mega-events, like Brazil’s, does not fit the usual explanation of 
simply trying to showcase their nation and increase soft power via sporting spectacles. 
Russia’s use of sports megas is less about sport diplomacy and much more part of a 
special governance strategy (Grix and Kramavera, 2015; see also “Putin and the 2014 
Winter Olympics: Russia’s Authoritarian Sports Diplomacy” in this book). 
Double-Edged Sword for Brazil? 
On the one hand, Brazil has seemingly avoided controversies related to violations of 
human and minority rights, but on the other hand, the country has suffered historically 
from a culture of corruption. More recently, two impressive cases of corruption 
emerged, affecting politicians of all levels, including two former presidents of the 
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republic. The first case of corruption affected the credibility of the then-president Luiz 
Inacio Lula da Silva, when in 2005, a vote-buying scheme named “mensalao” (big 
money stipend) was discovered inside the national congress (The Economist, 2013). After 
years of prosecution, the second most powerful man of Brazil at that time and the right-
hand man of Lula, Jose Dirceu went to jail in 2013, sending a positive message 
domestically and internationally about Brazil’s serious intentions to combat corruption 
(The Economist, 2013). Unfortunately, another corruption scheme has erupted in Brazil in 
2015.  Since then, a bribery scheme involving Petrobras, the state oil company, has 
placed a lot of supporters of the former president Ms. Dilma Rousseff under 
investigation. Most of these supporters belong to the left Worker’s Party, the party of 
former president Lula (Segal, 2015). Many politicians are still under investigation, but 
the apex of the case was reached in August 2016, when Ms. Roussef was impeached and 
removed from office.  
 Such cases of corruption have produced some popular manifestations against the 
government. For example, during the Confederations Cup in 2013, many protests and 
riots against corruption happened in different places in the country, mainly in the host 
cities of this event (Watts, 2014; Zirin, 2013). In October 2015, ten months before the 
2016 Olympic Games, more protests against corruption in the federal government 
erupted in Brazilian streets (Biller & Colitt, 2015). Most of the protesters involved in 
such resistance have requested the impeachment of the President Dilma Rousseff, 
mainly because of her alleged involvement in the bribery scheme of Petrobras. Because 
sport mega-events have brought Brazil into the international spotlight, such 
manifestations and their consequences may signal that Brazil is finally fighting 
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corruption seriously. In this sense, sport mega-events can help Brazil to be better 
perceived by other nations as a serious international player, not only because it is able 
to host such events, but also and mainly because it is able and willing to battle 
corruption. 
 Spalding et al. (2014) affirmed that the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic 
Games have drawn, and will draw, “the world’s attention to a nation’s anti-corruption 
efforts as few events ever could” (p. 2). These authors added that “Brazil has become a 
kind of vortex for the global anti-corruption movement,” because “its popular protests 
and governmental response in the form of specific legal reforms” (p. 3). In fact, the 
government response to the public outcry seems to be somehow linked to the fact that 
Brazil is in the international spotlight because of the sport mega-events. That is, the 
Brazilian government has felt the pressure of so much international exposure and 
started to support, at least symbolically, measures against corruption. In practice, as 
shown above, the federal government is highly involved in corruption scandals (Segal, 
2015). However, as noted by the international press, the Brazilian Federal Supreme 
Court has been more efficient than ever in trying to condemn politicians, lobbyists, and 
businessmen for corruption (The Economist, 2013). Meanwhile, scholars have mentioned 
that Brazil’s democratic institutions, independent judiciary, and free press have made 
the country more likely to improve its diplomacy via battling corruption when hosting 
the events; especially if someone compares it to previous hosts, such as Russia/Sochi 
2014 and China/Beijing 2008 (Spalding et al., 2014). 
 In this sense, the current status of Brazilian institutions in association with the 
international attention received by the country has helped Brazil to promote itself as a 
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less corrupt nation. However, the association with FIFA and the IOC can bring a reverse 
effect. Both institutions have been frequently involved with corruption in the remote 
and recent past (Abrahamson, 1999; Zirin, 2014). For instance, Joseph Blatter, FIFA 
president for the last 17 years, has recently resigned due to intense pressure from 
investigations by the FBI and Swiss prosecutors that have led to 18 senior soccer 
executives being charged on accusations of money laundering and tax evasion (Gibson, 
2015). The closer a country is associated with these organizations, the more they are 
likely to be suspected of involvement in corruption (Spalding et al., 2014). For example, 
Germany was recently accused of buying the right to host the 2006 World Cup (Smith, 
2015). According to German newspaper Der Spiegel, the bid committee bribed four 
Asian representatives with about US$11 million to vote for Germany’s candidature 
(Smith, 2015). Similarly, Qatar has been constantly accused of buying votes to be chosen 
as the host of the 2022 FIFA World Cup (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2014). Likewise, the 
2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi has brought a lot of corruption accusations over 
Russia. As noted by Arnold and Foxall (2014), “the astronomical cost of the Sochi 2014 
Olympic Games [US$51 billion] is an indictment of the pervasive corruption in the 
Russian system” (p. 6). Therefore, the challenge of Brazil is to use the international 
media interest before, during, and after the World Cup and the Olympics to showcase 
its fight against corruption, while avoiding FIFA and IOC corruption scandals. 
 Considering that the 2014 World Cup has already passed, in terms of sport 
policies, Brazilian authorities have focused on creating an environment in the country 
that helps national athletes to perform the best they can during the 2016 Olympic 
Games. They believe that an outstanding performance of the national athletes might 
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improve the country’s image internationally. Rhamey and Early (2013) support this 
belief when they reported that good performances in the Olympic Games (i.e., winning 
a lot of medals) would build a positive image and enhance the international prestige of 
any nation. Additionally, these authors found that both surpassing the expectations in 
Olympic performance (winning medals) and hosting the event would produce the 
greatest gains in terms of improving diplomatic contacts with other nations. 
 The decision to host sport mega-events is an attempt to break a virtual circle in 
elite sport in Brazil—to date, low investments have produced low performances. Brazil 
has had a very flat performance in terms of medals won in the Olympics. For example, 
in the last two Games—2012 London and 2008 Beijing—Brazil won 17 and 15 medals, 
finishing in the 23rd and 22nd position, respectively. For the 2016 Games, Brazilian 
sport authorities have established the goal of finishing among the top 10 (ESPN, 2015). 
In order to achieve this aim, they know much more investment needs to be put into 
sport. In hosting the 2016 Games, the local sport authorities have seen an opportunity to 
increase investments in both sporting infrastructure and the preparation of elite 
athletes. Rocha (2015) described four different federal programs, which have been 
supporting the preparation of Team Brazil for the 2016 Olympics. About R$1 billion will 
be invested in athletes’ preparation and physical structures and equipment between 
2013 and 2016 (Brasil, 2014)—two thirds of this money has come from federal funds and 
one third from sponsorships of public enterprises to support the preparation of the 
national teams. For example, the national bank—“Banco do Brasil”—has sponsored the 
Brazilian teams in volleyball, beach volleyball, sailing, and modern pentathlon. Other 
public organizations have supported other sports in Brazil, as part of the preparation 
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for the 2016 Olympic Games. 
 Such investments in elite sport and (the expected) outstanding performance in the 
2016 Olympic Games can bring some benefits to Brazil in diplomatic terms (Rhamey & 
Early, 2013). However, internal policies related to human and social rights are 
considered much more important to measure the diplomatic stature of a country than 
winning medals or hosting events. In this sense, Brazil’s strategy to focus heavily on 
elite sport, while relegating education and social sport to the status of a poor cousin 
may be a mistake, from a diplomatic point of view. The World Cup and the Olympic 
Games should be used to showcase a new Brazil, where sport is an important tool not 
only to produce better elite athletes, but also—and mainly—to promote well-being, 
social rights, gender equity, and diversity. Unfortunately, the social and educational 
sport programs in the country have received fewer resources than the elite sport 
programs (Rocha, 2015). Only China, among the so-called emerging states, has been 
able to put on a spectacular Olympic event and top the Olympic medal table. Success in 
elite sport requires lots of resources over an extended period of time; it also requires a 
coordinated sports system with high quality school and community sport. Brazil is a 
long way from fulfilling these requirements. 
Final Remarks 
Brazil has struggled to be perceived as a higher-stature actor in international affairs. 
The country’s most important diplomatic aspiration remains to have a permanent seat 
on the United Nations Security Council. So far Brazil has not been successful in its 
attempts to accomplish this and a number of other aims related to international affairs. 
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Currently, Brazil has attempted to use the 2014 World Cup and will use the 2016 
Olympic Games to expand its soft power and diplomatic status. Hosting sports megas 
has been acknowledged as an important strategy to send messages of economic 
maturity and diplomatic importance to other international states (Grix et al., 2015). 
 Comparing Brazil to other developing nations that have recently used similar 
strategies, we note that the nation has had relative success in avoiding overt negative 
publicity, mainly related to violations of human and minority rights (which were 
frequently linked to China and Russia during the 2008 Beijing Games and the 2014 
Sochi Winter Games). However, as we have pointed out, the constant media scrutiny 
that accompanies the hosting of a global sporting spectacle can reveal to the world more 
than just positive aspects of a country. For example, the media focus on Brazil has 
exposed many cases of corruption (despite the fact that corruption is endemic in this 
country). Moreover, Brazil has not escaped criticisms related to environment 
deterioration. The literature has reported the impact of construction of Olympic 
facilities on environmentally protected areas of Rio de Janeiro city and a pervasive 
concern about real estate speculation (Gaffney, 2013). In this sense, hosting sports mega-
events and receiving extensive media coverage can be a double-edged sword for Brazil. 
Dealing with negative coverage, while reinforcing the positive aspects of the country is 
a difficult mission, which needs to be quickly accomplished if it wants to use the sports 
mega-events as catalysts for its diplomatic growth. 
 Finally, we argue that successfully hosting the sport mega-events and handling 
media coverage in a positive way might not be sufficient to elevate the current 
diplomatic status of Brazil. These events have brought a lot of attention to competitive 
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sport and much has been invested in this area. Consequently, given the limited 
resources overall, little has been invested in educational and social sport programs. 
When the party is over, the medals are counted, and the Olympic caravan moves on, 
Brazil might not accrue all possible diplomatic benefits from hosting sports mega-
events because of its focus on investing large amounts of money in sports stadia and 
promoting elite sport. We would suggest a better investment balance between elite 
sport, on the one hand, and social and educational sport programs, on the other. This is 
based on the fact that internal policies related to human and social rights are considered 
much more important to measure the diplomatic stature of a country than winning 
medals or hosting events. 
Discussion Questions 
1. What is your perception about Brazil’s current diplomatic status? 
2. Do you believe that the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Games had the same types 
of impact on the country, internally and internationally? 
3. Thinking about legacies in general, do you think that hosting the two largest sport 
events in such a short period was strategically beneficial for Brazil? Why? 
4. Do you think that hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games has 
helped Brazil to improve its diplomatic status? Why? 
5. Point out three benefits Brazil has reaped from hosting the 2016 Olympic Games. 
6. Point out three criticism Brazil has suffered for having hosted the 2016 Olympic 
Games. 
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